Moscow, Jan 24 (EFE).- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have parked, at least for now, his delusions of grandeur and is content to secure control of Donbas as the main trophy after four years of bloody war.
The conquest of so-called Novorossiya (New Russia), an imperial chimera that once encompassed nearly half of Ukrainian territory, has given way to a harsher reality on the battlefield: the Russian army has proven unable to defeat its Ukrainian counterpart.
In recent weeks, the Kremlin has conspicuously avoided public references to the other two regions it annexed in 2022, the southern regions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, whose northern thirds remain under Ukrainian control.
Donbas as the minimum acceptable outcome
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made this clear after consultations held in the early hours of Friday between Putin and White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
According to Peskov, the main condition for a lasting peace agreement is the “withdrawal” of Ukrainian forces from the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
There was no mention of Zaporizhzhia or Kherson, a position that until recently had been treated as dogma.
As of now, Russian forces control nearly 80 percent of Donetsk, where Ukraine still holds around 5,000 square kilometers, and almost all of Luhansk.
This represents a minimum objective. Russia recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk just three days before launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.

The issue dominated negotiations between the two sides in Abu Dhabi on Friday and is expected to remain central on Saturday, with the Russian delegation led for the first time by an admiral, Igor Kostiukov, deputy chief of the General Staff and head of military intelligence.
Both the United States and Ukraine would not look unfavorably on the creation of a demilitarized zone, particularly as Kyiv fears that losing all of Donbas could open the door to new Russian offensives toward the flatter terrain of northern and central Ukraine.
Southern Ukraine: ambition meets constraint
Although abandoning the ambition to seize all of southern Ukraine will draw criticism from hardline nationalist circles, Moscow has few realistic options to capture the city of Zaporizhzhia or to cross the Dnipro River and retake Kherson, from which Russian troops withdrew in 2022, the Kremlin’s single greatest military setback of the war.
Despite continued rhetoric from Russian politicians that Odesa is a “Russian city,” the reality is that Ukraine’s main port remains out of reach of both Russian ground forces and its navy, which paid a heavy price during its failed attempt to blockade the city in the Black Sea.
Russia did, however, achieve one key strategic objective in the first year of the war by effectively turning the Sea of Azov into an inland sea, shielding the Crimean peninsula from Ukrainian naval pressure.
Yet Crimea’s long-term survival would not be viable without the land corridor established through southern Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, linking the Russian mainland to the peninsula, which suffers from chronic water shortages.
Putin now hopes that US President Donald Trump will persuade Congress to recognize Crimea as Russian territory.
The Kremlin’s apparent understanding of the White House’s ambitions regarding Greenland fits neatly into this logic of reciprocal geopolitical appeasement.
A frozen conflict, not a victory
For months, the Kremlin has been invoking a supposed secret “Anchorage consensus,” referring to the August 2025 summit between Putin and Trump, which allegedly set aside demands for an immediate ceasefire as a precondition for settling the conflict.
Moscow has been careful not to reveal the contents of this formula. According to press reports, it would entail Russian control of all Donbas and a freezing of the front lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, an implicit admission of the Russian army’s limitations.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces would need more than a year to fully capture Donetsk, let alone the time and resources required to consolidate control over all four annexed regions.
For months, Putin predicted an imminent collapse of the Ukrainian front.
While desertions in Ukrainian ranks are real, fierce resistance and the inefficiency of Russian military tactics have proven far more decisive.
While Western estimates put Russian daily casualties at around 25,000, Kremlin-aligned military bloggers are already speaking of between 300,000 and 400,000 deaths since 2022, an astronomical figure compared with the roughly 15,000 Soviet fatalities during the decade-long war in Afghanistan.
In the end, Russia may inherit not only a Donbas rich in coal, steelworks, metallurgical plants and rare earths, but also a devastated, depopulated no man’s land, pulverized by relentless bombardment and requiring decades of reconstruction. EFE,
mos-sk






